I work mainly in epistemology, but I also enjoy thinking about questions in the philosophy of language.
My dissertation investigates truth-aptness defeat: evidence that your belief, credence, or etc. is worse than false—it doesn’t even have a truth-apt content. Truth-aptness defeat shows that there must be a new dimension along which we can adjust our attitudes, which I call how "firmly" they are "held". Holding an attitude less firmly is a novel way of weakening it; doing so is the proper response to truth-aptness defeat.
PUBLICATIONS
Interrogating the Linguistic Argument for KK
The Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
The KK thesis says that if S knows that p, then S knows that S knows that p. A common argument for KK is that it can explain why certain assertions (of the form p & ~KKp) are infelicitous. I undermine that argument: only the less plausible version of KK ("Weak KK") can explain the data, and in any case, a "believe that you know" norm on assertion can explain the data without appealing to KK. Overall, KK has much less explanatory power than is often supposed.
PAPERS IN PROGRESS (drafts available)
[1] "Third-Personal Self-Promises"
[2] "The Varieties of Infelicity"
In this paper, I examine the different things that "infelicitous" might mean, and study the consequences for arguments concerning norms on assertion.
[3] [a paper on Cautious Monotonicity] (under review)
this page last updated 5/19/25